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IMPROVING THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
THROUGH DECRIMINALIZATION ∗
“The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that
if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
still be done.” 1 The constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel in criminal prosecutions is one of the many safeguards
contained within the Sixth Amendment designed to protect the
fundamental human rights of life and liberty. 2 Unfortunately, for
indigent defendants that safeguard of life and liberty operates as
a mere platitude today. Stephen Bright, founder of the Southern
Center for Human Rights, has bleakly summarized the crisis of
indigent defense, noting that while the right to counsel is widely
celebrated, it is not actually observed with equal force. 3
Over the past half-century, the right to counsel has been
greatly expanded and solidified doctrinally. 4 Two guiding
principles stand at the foreground of that expansion. First, the
right to counsel provides that if an individual is too poor to afford
his own defense, the state must furnish a lawyer to represent him. 5
Second, the right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance – not just the presence of an individual who happens to
be a lawyer standing alongside the accused. 6 Unfortunately,
while the Supreme Court has repeatedly stood in strong defense
of the right to counsel and expounded on its vitality to the criminal
∗
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1. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See id.
3. Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles Into Reality, THE CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6, http://library.law.yale.edu /sites /default /files/ turning _principles _into
_reality__gideon_at_40_-_champion.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TEC-9C52] (“No constitutional
right is celebrated so much in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to
counsel.”).
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
6. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86.
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justice system and the necessity of a fair trial, 7 the promises of
Gideon and Strickland have disappointingly gone unfulfilled. 8
The problem is easy to identify. Public defenders are
perpetually forced to deal with unmanageable caseloads far
exceeding professional guidelines. 9 Gideon’s promise has gone
unrealized for over half a century because public defenders have
persistently been crippled in their pursuit of justice due to
tremendous caseloads and funding deficits. 10 The never-ending
inadequacies of public defense has led some scholars to somberly
describe criminal defense in the United States as being in a
“permanent state of crisis.” 11 The most troubling aspect of this
permanent crisis is that the problem could not be any more salient.
Since Gideon was decided, at least one major independent report
has been released every five years documenting the inadequacies
of indigent defense. 12
Despite the overwhelming evidence of the state of crisis in
which indigent defense finds itself in year after year, state
legislatures have been largely unresponsive to repeated pleas
from both public defenders and legal scholars for increased
funding. 13 Public defenders suffer from excessive caseloads and
insufficient resources. 14 If the public refuses to help our
defenders on the back-end through increased funding, the
alternative is to reduce caseloads on the front-end of the criminal
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
8. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2063-64 (2000) [hereinafter Gideon’s Promise].
9. Id.
10. Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: Providing High-Quality Public
Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713-14 (2013).
11. Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an “Ex Ante”
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 246 (1997); Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031,
1045 (2006) (“By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system,
the defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.”).
12. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (1999); see also Gideon’s Promise, supra note 8, at 2064;
Thompson, supra note 10, at 723.
13. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 430 (2009); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of
Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 465 (2007) (noting that for
years, indigent defense advocates have pled for more funding, but “those pleas [have] fallen
on deaf ears”).
14. Hashimoto, supra note 13, at 465.
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justice system. 15 Any conversation about defense caseloads
should focus on the misdemeanor dockets. In 2009, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NADL”) issued a
report that estimated approximately 10.5 million misdemeanor
prosecutions occur annually. 16
Misdemeanors make up
approximately 80% of most state dockets, and the typical
encounter between the average American and the criminal justice
system is through the misdemeanor gateway. 17 According to data
collected by the Court Statistics Project, for 2015, thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia reported data consistent with
NADL’s estimation in 2009. 18 Decriminalization of certain
misdemeanors has been recognized as a way to lower defender
caseloads and save defender offices millions of dollars. 19
Public defender caseloads are currently over-inflated with
low-level, non-violent crimes, so decriminalizing certain
misdemeanors would effectively reduce the caseloads of public
defenders, allowing them to actually provide their remaining
clients with the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
constitution. 20 Two offenses are prime candidates for such
decriminalization efforts: driving with a suspended license and
marijuana offenses. By removing marijuana offenses and driving
with a suspended license from criminal dockets, public defenders
15. Contra id. (arguing that the solution to the indigent defense crisis is to reduce the
right to counsel for misdemeanor offenses allowing defenders to focus their efforts on their
felony clients where defenders can be more effective).
16. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), https:// www.
nacdl.org/ criminal defense.aspx?id=20188&libID=20158 [https://perma.cc/7L7V-M26V]
[hereinafter MINOR CRIMES].
17. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1063 (2015).
18. See Court Statistics Project, 2015 Criminal Caseloads – Trial Courts,
http://www.ncsc.org /Sitecore /Content /Microsites /PopUp /Home /CSP /CSP_ Criminal
[https://perma.cc/D79C-5VPL] (Select data year “2015”; then select chart/table “Statewide
Misdem. Caseloads and Rates”; Do not select an individual state) (The thirty-four
jurisdictions reported around 9.5 million misdemeanors out of over 12 million total crimes.
Of these reporting jurisdictions, misdemeanors made up a collective 77% of all crimes in
these jurisdictions).
19. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1073.
20. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 294 (2011) (“Although excessive
workloads are cause for concern in both the felony and misdemeanor context, individuals
facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to suffer the consequences of the workload
strain.”).
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will have more time and resources to allocate to their remaining
clients, getting the nation one step closer to honoring the demands
of the Sixth Amendment so that justice can “still be done.”
Part I of this comment will briefly summarize the current
state of indigent defense. Part II will briefly summarize the
different strategies of decriminalization and their respective
strengths and weaknesses. Part III will explain why marijuana
charges and driving with a suspended license are prime
candidates for decriminalization. Finally, Part IV will discuss
what policy makers should be mindful of when undertaking
decriminalization efforts.

I. THE CURRENT STATE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
Even well before Gideon guaranteed the right to counsel to
indigent defendants, Justice Hugo Black simply stated, “[t]here
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has.” 21 Even after Gideon’s mandate,
there has been no shortage of legal critics lamenting that the
structural inadequacies of public defense in America have
continued to negatively impact indigent defendants. 22 Excessive
caseloads severely limit a public defender’s capabilities resulting
in representation that is neither competent nor diligent. 23 As long
as public defenders are crippled by unmanageable caseloads, they
will be systemically incapable of providing the same level of
service that would be expected of private counsel, and Justice
Black’s warning will be forgotten and obsolete. 24
The right to counsel has continued along a parabolic
trajectory, expanding on an upward trajectory providing
protections for more and more Americans before being caught
and slowly pulled back down to a more limited function. First,
the United States Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama 25 that
21. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
22. See generally Thompson, supra note 10; Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like
Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice
System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 315, 316-19 (2012); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About
Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1309, 1331 (2013).
23. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN
PUBLIC DEFENSE 6 (2011).
24. See id. at 6-7.
25. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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under limited circumstances, the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants in a capital case was required under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 Thirty years
later, Justice Black’s admonition against treating indigents
separately in the criminal law context was heeded, and Gideon
extended the holding of Powell, this time finding a constitutional
mandate in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, incorporating
the indigent’s right to counsel for felony cases. 27 The scope of
the right to counsel continued to expand, covering a multitude of
situations such as juvenile delinquency proceedings 28 or a first
direct appeal of a conviction. 29 Ultimately, the right to counsel
reached its peak when the Supreme Court declared that the right
to be represented by counsel expanded to all criminal cases
resulting in imprisonment and the loss of liberty, including
misdemeanors. 30 However, the right to counsel has subsequently
been undermined, reducing the impetus for states to honor the
constitutional mandate. 31 Currently, for the right to counsel to
attach, there must be “actual imprisonment” rather than “the mere
threat of imprisonment.” 32 This means that the right to counsel
26. Id. at 71 (limiting the right to be appointed counsel to indigents in capital cases
who are ignorant, feeble-minded, illiterate, or the like).
27. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).
29. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
30. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
658 (2002) (holding that the right to counsel applies even where a defendant is given a
suspended sentence subject to revocation because the revocation would result in
imprisonment). It is important to note that the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is often
not respected, and many misdemeanants end up being prosecuted without ever being offered
the ability to exercise their constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1341-43 (2012); Roberts, supra note 20,
at 311-12. One of the most outrageous refusals to recognize the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases is found in the words of Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, who stated publicly at a meeting of the State Bar:
“Alabama v. Shelton [is] one of the more misguided decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, I must say. If we adhered to it in South Carolina we would have the right to counsel
probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to take these cases in every
magistrate’s court in South Carolina, and I have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t
have the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up we [are] not adhering to Alabama
v. Shelton in every situation.” MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 15, n.35 (alterations in
original).
31. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1066
(2013).
32. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that just because a crime
may be punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, the defendant is not entitled to counsel
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can be ignored if the court and prosecution are willing to forego
the option of imprisonment for an offense. 33 While the “actual
imprisonment” doctrine has its critics, the truly fatal blows to the
right to counsel have arisen in the effective assistance of counsel
line of cases. 34 In Powell and Gideon, the Court discussed the
vital role of defense counsel with lofty language eloquently
defending the necessity of counsel for indigents, but Strickland
undermined the aspirations of Powell and Gideon by creating a
disparagingly low bar for attorney competence. 35 The result is
the right to the assistance of an attorney without a meaningful way
to measure if the presence of the attorney actually impacted the
process for the defendant in any manner. 36
With these general principles in mind, I can now turn to the
actual state of crisis indigent defense finds itself in year after year.
As noted above, there is no shortage of legal scholars or
independent reports documenting the problem of overburdened
public defenders, so an in-depth discussion of such reports here
would add little to the growing conversation. 37 Instead, it would
be more useful for the purposes of this comment to reserve the
discussion to three factors shaping indigent defense: (1)
misdemeanor dockets across the nation have exploded, resulting
in reduced efficiency of public defenders; (2) legislatures and the
political process as a whole are largely unresponsive to repeated
pleas for increased funding; and (3) structural lawsuits are
ineffective and unreliable means of forcing states to increase
indigent defense spending.
unless imprisonment is being sought by the state or will certainly result from the conviction).
But see Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (but not a lot) of the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 149-51
(2009) (detailing how some jurisdictions go beyond the “actual imprisonment” standard and
provide the right to counsel to a much broader scope of criminal cases than that required
under the federal constitution).
33. Roberts, supra note 20, at 311.
34. See infra Part I.B.3 and accompanying footnotes discussing Strickland.
35. Natapoff, supra note 31, 1066 (“‘Strickland skepticism,’ the conclusion that
Strickland’s low bar for attorney competence has effectively gutted the substantive right to
counsel . . . . ”).
36. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 315 (“[T]he Strickland test offers little concrete
guidance to lower courts analyzing actual claims of ineffective assistance and to defense
attorneys regulated by its Sixth Amendment holding.”).
37. For an updated list of different independent publications discussing indigent
defense, visit https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=20188&libID =20158
[https://perma.cc/NR8V-YVSV].
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A. Misdemeanor Caseloads
For the past couple of decades, the widely accepted
professional standard for caseload limits for a full-time public
defender has been 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile
cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals per year. 38
However, misdemeanor defenders across the nation repeatedly
handle caseloads in extreme excess of the guidelines. 39 The most
notorious example is the New Orleans Public Defender Office,
which reported that its attorneys handle approximately 19,000
cases per year, greater than forty-seven times the recommended
amount, which only allows the attorneys to spend a total of seven
minutes per case. 40 Public Defenders in Minnesota have reported
only having an average of twelve minutes per client to handle
each case in court, which does not allow for any additional
research or other paperwork on behalf of the defender. 41 While
the situations in New Orleans and Minnesota are far worse than
the rest of the nation, those jurisdictions are not alone, as several
other offices also reported annual misdemeanor caseloads of up
to 3,000. 42
The amount of misdemeanor cases in the United States is
staggering. Estimates show that approximately 2 million felony
cases are filed each year compared to 10 million misdemeanor
cases. 43 At first glance, one might suggest that misdemeanors
should of course be much more common than felonies because
most Americans are not dangerous criminals, and only the worst
behavior is reserved for designation as felonious. However, the
38. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 21. Also, it is important to note that the
guidelines themselves might be too high because the guidelines assume that the defender is
a full-time litigator and that the defender works in close proximity to the courthouse.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Jessica Mador, A Public Defender’s Day: 12 Minutes Per Client, MINN. PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 29, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010 /11/29/publicdefenders [https://perma.cc/H7N9-A398].
42. Id.; see also Maureen Dimino, Misdemeanor Courts Are in Need of Repair,
CHAMPION, June 2009, at 36, 39 (summarizing survey data of public defender misdemeanor
caseloads as follows: 2,000 misdemeanors per year in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami; 1,200
in Dallas; 1,500-3,000 in Tennessee; 2,500 in Utah; 927 in Grant County, Washington);
Roberts, supra note 20, at 279-80 (noting contract defense attorneys in Detroit, Michigan
average 2,400 to 2,800 misdemeanors a year, an amount in excess of the standard guideline
by 500%).
43. See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1063.
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more accurate answer is likely that the process of
overcriminalization has caused the number of misdemeanor
offenses to skyrocket.
Overcriminalization is the process of the state
inappropriately abusing the power to impose criminal sanctions
on conduct that does not rise to the level of harmfulness or
culpability warranting such sanctions. 44 There are many separate
factors fueling overcriminalization. First, the political process
forces politicians to appear “tough on crime” by moving to
expand the penal code on claims that such actions will reduce
overall crime and deter other illegal behavior. 45 Second, the
rhetoric surrounding this “tough on crime” stance has essentially
eroded the harm principle, so it is only getting easier to continue
to capture more and more behavior under the umbrella of the
penal law. 46 Third, law enforcement is incentivized to enforce
minor crimes in order to build their record and seek professional
advancement. 47 Lastly, the judiciary has failed to check
overcriminalization for multiple reasons, including “the anxiety
of appearing to be a Lochner-esque super-legislature . . . .” 48 The
result is criminal codes that are both overly broad, criminalizing
a wide range of behavior, and overly deep, providing for criminal
liability for the same action several times over under multiple
different statutes. 49
Behavior that was traditionally viewed as “undesirable” or
“poor manners” has increasingly been removed from the realm of
44. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 713-16
(2005) (noting that the decision to label behavior as criminal is to make “a critical moral
judgment” about conduct and the perpetrator, and the ability for the state to deprive an
individual of his liberty, along with collateral consequences, is a remedy not found in any
other area of the law); see also Douglas Husak, Reservations About Overcriminalization, 14
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 97, 100-02 (2011) (arguing punishments under the criminal law are
unique from other sanctions under the law because they contain an expressive element
“designed to censure and to stigmatize” the offender).
45. Luna, supra note 44, at 718-20.
46. See id. at 718, 720.
47. Id. at 723-24 (“Although law enforcers are generally charged to ‘do justice,’ they
are not neutral and detached entities within the legal system, wholly indifferent to outcomes
in particular cases or net results over time. Like all other professionals, police and
prosecutors seek the personal esteem and promotion that accompany success, typically
measured by the number of arrests for the former and convictions for the latter.”).
48. Id. at 724.
49. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 512-19 (2001).
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social norms into the criminal sphere. 50 The plethora of “criminal
behavior” that legislative bodies have felt compelled to attach
criminal sanctions to includes: unleashed pets, failure to use a
seatbelt, putting one’s feet up on a subway seat, lying across or
otherwise taking up two subway seats, riding bicycles on
sidewalks, sleeping in a cardboard box, and even feeding the
homeless. 51
In 2011, the New York City courts were clogged with more
than 20,000 arraignments for “theft of services,” which is
commonly charged for turnstile jumping. 52 Around the country,
defender offices report that petty, nonviolent offenses such as
public drunkenness, obstructing a walkway, or driving without a
license are frequently charged and eat up much of the defenders’
time. 53 Overcriminalization is problematic because it actually
creates crimes rather than merely acknowledging certain, already
recognized as morally blameworthy, behavior as criminal. 54
The expansion of the substantive scope of criminal codes is
only half of the story. It is actually police and prosecutors who
decide to what extent any given law is enforced. 55 In New York
City, 20,000 individuals were not arraigned because turnstile
jumping was a crime – they were arraigned because a police
50. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 25.
51. Id. For an excellent survey of city ordinances aimed at making the act of being
homeless a crime, including ordinances making it a misdemeanor to sit down in certain
public places, see NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE
PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16-29 (2015),
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/7XN2-6JPT].
52. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2011),
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/annualreport2011/pdf. [https://perma.cc / 4C
Y M – V 94Q].
53. See THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 5 (2013), http:// www.brennancenter.org/ sites/ default
/files /publications /Gideon_Report_040913.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2EU-YPJR].
54. Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 538-39 (2012) (“In addition to the ever-expanding number of criminal
statutes, standard critiques of overcriminalization also bemoan the broad scope of modern
criminal codes. Contemporary criminal codes reach conduct that, in previous generations,
would not have been subject to punishment. The classic example is so-called regulatory
offenses. These offenses punish conduct that is mala prohibita, or wrongful only because it
is illegal, and may allow punishment where ‘consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting.’ With the proliferation of regulatory offenses, infractions that in prior generations
might not even have resulted in civil fines or tort liability are now subject to the punishment
and stigma of the criminal law.”).
55. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 521 (“Legislators speak, but police and prosecutors
control the volume.”).
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officer arrested them, and a prosecutor proceeded with the
prosecution. 56 Police officers appreciate the broadening of
criminal codes because “quality of life” offenses, crimes focused
at low-level street behavior, reduce the investigative burden on
officers before they may conduct searches and arrests on the
street. 57 Prosecutors are motivated to work efficiently and
produce high conviction rates, and the broadening of the criminal
law
allows
prosecutors
to
meet
those
goals. 58
Overcriminalization creates new crimes and overlapping crimes
that allow for charge-stacking which in turn greatly enhances a
prosecutor’s bargaining ability when negotiating pleas, which
produces more convictions at a substantially diminished cost. 59
The result is excessive caseloads that have given rise to a
practice referred to as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” where a
defender’s only communication with a client is often a hurried
conversation only a few minutes before a court appearance. 60 The
sheer speed through which misdemeanor courts must operate
given the voluminous caseloads has also been described as “[an]
‘assembly line,’ ‘cattle-herding,’ and ‘McJustice’ . . . .” 61 A
counter-argument might be made that a petty offense does not
require a sophisticated legal defense, so a public defender does
not need a large swath of time to devote to misdemeanor cases;
however, the problem arises on the systemic level because as long
as a case is active, a defender still has to attend arraignments and
other hearings and file and argue various motions. 62 Non-violent,
low-level offenses clog the criminal justice system and distract
public defender resources from more serious crimes. 63

56. James C. McKinley Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court
May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/nyregion/
subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/J5S5-5MZ9].
57. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 539 (“The Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be
supported by probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Street stops must
be supported by reasonable suspicion of crime. In both instances, the operative word is
‘crime.’ If that word includes enough behavior, if crime is defined broadly enough, police
can stop or arrest whomever they wish.”).
58. See id. at 537-38.
59. Id. at 536-37.
60. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2012).
61. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1064.
62. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 5.
63. Id.
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Perhaps the most obvious problem with excessive caseloads
is that they prevent public defenders from fulfilling their ethical
obligations. 64 Several scholars have argued that heavy caseloads
force public defenders to violate a number of rules of professional
conduct. 65
Most notably, a public defender repeatedly
experiences concurrent conflicts of interest 66 when he is forced to
divide his time amongst the hundreds of clients currently assigned
to him. 67 The conflict of interest does not necessarily arise out of
the fact that a defender’s clients will have competing interests but
rather that the defender is not able to perform his duties with the
level of diligence 68 and competence 69 required of counsel. 70 Of
course, putting aside the rules of professional conduct, the United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that “the ‘Assistance of
Counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that
such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order
requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests.” 71 Yet, despite the clear instructions laid
down by both the rules of professional conduct and the Supreme
Court, public defenders repeatedly find themselves forced to
choose which clients will receive effective legal assistance. 72

64. LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 27.
65. Id.; Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive
Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 442-48 (2012).
66. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016).
67. Anderson, supra note 65, at 443.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A
lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”).
70. LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 27-29.
71. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
72. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 69 (2009), http://
www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AEK8V5D] [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (quoting Missouri State Public Defender Deputy
Director).
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B. The Impossibility of Funding
Increasing funding for public defense is not a politically
feasible solution. In fact, state legislatures have exacerbated the
problem by continuing to cut public defense budgets despite
constantly rising caseloads. 73 The problem is twofold. First,
funding amongst prosecution and defense functions is heavily
slanted in favor of prosecution and law enforcement. 74 Second,
the political reality is that most Americans and their elected
representatives are unwilling to spend money to help “criminals”
avoid punishment. 75

1. Funding Gaps
There is a large disparity in the funding and staffing of
prosecutors’ offices and defense offices across the nation. The
American Bar Association has noted that national standards
specify that in the pursuit of fairness, government spending on
prosecution and indigent defense functions should be
equivalent. 76 Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno was a
strong proponent of this view arguing that the strength of the
entire criminal justice system depends on the strength and
adequacy of each “leg” of the system including indigent
defense. 77
The current system is not as fair as Janet Reno or the national
guidelines would call for. The most recent national census
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2007,
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 68.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
AM. BAR ASS’N, BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE 13 (2004), http:/ /texaswcl.tamu.edu /reports /2004_ ABA_ Gideon’s_ Broken_
Promise.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX4M-2KBN].
77. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NAT’L
SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH
EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS xiii (1999) (“My experiences
as a prosecutor and as Attorney General have taught me just how important it is for every
leg of the criminal justice system to stand strong. Indigent defense is an equally essential
element of the criminal justice process, one which should be appropriately structured and
funded and operating with effective standards . . . . When the conviction of a defendant is
challenged on the basis of inadequate representation, the very legitimacy of the conviction
itself is called into question. Our criminal justice system is interdependent: if one leg of the
system is weaker than the others, the whole system will ultimately falter.”).
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state prosecutors’ budgets nationwide were $5.8 billion.78
Conversely, state and local public defender offices operated on a
budget of only $2.3 billion in 2007. 79 Additionally, state
prosecutors’ offices enjoyed approximately 25,000 attorneys and
25,000 support staff 80 compared to the 15,000 attorneys and
10,000 support staff employed by defenders’ offices. 81 If the
inequality were not apparent enough, it is certainly worth noting
that the figures for prosecutors’ offices are indeed undervalued.
The 2007 Census of State Court Prosecutors excluded offices of
municipal attorneys or county attorneys who appear in lower
courts of limited jurisdiction. 82 Those previously mentioned
figures, which already greatly exceeded the resources of
defenders’ offices, do not totally account for the full amount of
prosecution expenditures.
States cannot dismiss the inequality in funding as a symptom
of budgetary shortfalls because the federal government offers
grants to help fund criminal justice efforts at the state level. 83 One
grant, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program, gave states $287 million in 2012 to go toward criminal
justice purposes. 84 States award more than 60% of those funds to
law enforcement and only a small portion to prosecutors and
defenders. 85 However, even within that small amount there is
approximately a 7 to 1 ratio between funding given to prosecutors
and funding given to defenders. 86
It may be argued that excessive caseloads weigh down the
entire criminal justice system. After all, if public defenders are
having to defend so many cases, obviously the prosecutors are
having to push those cases forward in the first place. However,
78. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (Dec. 2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/L69E-CGF4].
79. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 1 (Jun. 22,
2010), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/53DL-WRDH].
80. PERRY & BANKS, supra note 78, at 4 tbl.2.
81. LANGTON & FAROLE, JR., supra note 79, at 2.
82. PERRY & BANKS, supra note 78, at 1.
83. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (noting that in 2010, states allocated $13.8 million of grant money to
prosecutors, but only $1.9 million to public defenders).
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the data explicitly refutes this notion that the rising tide raises all
ships. The public defenders’ offices are carrying the lion’s share
of these massive caseloads. Prosecutors’ offices across the nation
receive more than two-and-a-half times as much funding as
defenders’ offices. The “assembly-line,” “McJustice” form of
criminal justice that has developed does not weigh on prosecutors
in the same manner that it cripples public defenders.

2. Political Landscape
There is little public support for increasing indigent defense
funding. 87 “Television and the media, along with strict anti-crime
policies, have all contributed to the public perception that
individuals who commit crimes are dangerous ‘others’ not
deserving of any protection.” 88 The political hostility to
strengthening indigent defense is not a new phenomenon. During
a hearing on the crisis of indigent defense funding held during the
1982 Annual Conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, one witness eloquently summarized the political
landscape acknowledging that there is “no popular solution” to
indigent defense funding because helping criminal defendants is
not a high priority for the public. 89 Over thirty years later, a
popular solution has yet to emerge.
The political process is heavily slanted against indigent
defendants through systemic disenfranchisement. “Indigent
defendants represent the archetypical ‘discrete and insular
87. For a general discussion of the political backlash to effective representation of
criminal defendants, see Gideon’s Promise, supra note 8, at 2066-68.
88. Thompson, supra note 10, at 714-15.
89. AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING
15-16 (1982), https://www.americanbar.org /content /dam /aba /administrative /
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads/indigentdefense/gideonundone.authcheckdam.p
df [https://perma.cc/54UH-WMGC] (“There is no popular solution to this question of
indigent defense funding . . . . People are sick and tired of paying for programs they don’t
believe in . . . . Today, the indigent defendant in Massachusetts faces a system that’s
determined to arrange for his arrest, provide for his prosecution and require his incarceration
if convicted. There is less determination to pay any money for his effective representation in
court. The legislature is faced with a shortage of funds. It’s a question of priority as to which
programs are going to get funded. A program for funding the representation of a man that’s
accused of breaking into your house is not going to go through . . . . What I’m asking you all
here today as members of the bar is to realize this is a very very unpopular subject. There is
no public support whatsoever . . . . Legislators in a democracy have to be elected. We can’t
expect much support from them. The last line of defense rests with the bar.”).
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minority’ . . . .” 90 People accused of crimes are generally
removed from the political process because they usually come
from “poor and alienated” social groups or they have legally been
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction. 91 What results is
that legislators must respond to the general electorate which
demands that politicians be “tough on crime;” meanwhile, the
unpopular and silent constituency of criminal defendants
continues to go ignored. 92
A great example of how public defense is seen not as a
constitutional mandate but rather as yet another agency seeking
public funds is illustrated in Missouri’s fight between former
Governor Jay Nixon and Michael Barrett, the director of
Missouri’s public defender system. 93 In 2014, Barrett presented
the Missouri General Assembly with empirical evidence based
partly on tracking Missouri defenders’ time usage that showed
Missouri public defenders were unable to devote as much time to
their cases as prevailing professional norms would suggest. 94 For
example, for noncapital murder cases, Missouri defenders
reported spending an average of 84.5 hours per case whereas
experts suggested the professional norm would be 106.6 hours. 95
Persuaded by the empirical evidence, the Missouri General
Assembly approved a $3.47 million funding increase for the
Missouri Public Defender’s Office. 96 However, Governor Jay
Nixon vetoed the legislation, and although his veto was
overridden, he simply refused to distribute the funds. 97 When the

90. Drinan, supra note 13, at 430.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Katie Reilly, Missouri’s Governor Cut Funding to the State’s Public
Defenders. So They Assigned Him a Case, TIME.COM (Aug. 4, 2016), http://time.com
/4439083/missouri-public-defender-governor-jay-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/29DA-FG7L].
94. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 23-24 (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org /content /dam /aba /events /legal _ aid_indigent_ defendants
/2014 /ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report. authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JC8T -BN5W].
95. Id.
96. See Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 2, 2016), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com /politics /archive /2016 /06 /on-the-defensive /485165 /
[https://perma.cc/4D6A-JSVH].
97. See id.; Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices are
Suing – and Starting to Win, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2017), http:// www.abajournal.com
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next fiscal year rolled around, Governor Nixon actually cut the
budget of the public defender’s office by $3.47 million, the same
amount as the original increase. 98 The Governor then approved
$4 million for State Fairground improvements, $52 million for a
new state park, and a staggering $998 million for a new football
stadium. 99 While the Missouri General Assembly accepted
Barret’s empirical evidence that his office was not fulfilling its
constitutional obligations to its clients, Governor Nixon saw the
office as merely another agency simply competing for a piece of
the state budget. 100 As long as indigent defense is viewed in this
way, funding will never be adequately supplied because “helping
criminals” is just not as popular of a cause as football stadiums or
state parks.

3. Structural Litigation
Realizing the political process is unfavorable to criminal
defendants, advocates have begun to turn to the courts, claiming
the structural inadequacies in public defense deprived indigent
defendants of the right to effective assistance of counsel.101
Structural lawsuits claim that the manner in which states are
choosing to fulfill the mandate from Gideon to provide indigent
defendants with counsel still falls short of the additional
requirement set forth in Strickland that defendants have access to
effective assistance of counsel. 102 Claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel under Strickland require a defendant to show (1) that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) the defendant was prejudiced as a result of
such deficiency. 103 The general argument is that when states

/magazine /article/the_gideon_revolution/ [https://perma.cc/MR6W-Y7H2] (noting this was
legal under state law because revenues did not match projections).
98. Walsh, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. See Reilly, supra note 93.
101. For an excellent summary of structural litigation, see generally Drinan, supra
note 13.
102. See id. at 432-33.
103. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). It is important to note that
many scholars have criticized Strickland as being “toothless” and a meaningless standard.
See Drinan, supra note 22, at 1318; George C. Thomas III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent
Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH L.
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force public defenders to represent too many clients at once,
individual clients fail to receive the proper guidance required of
counsel. 104
However, legal scholars have begun to comment that the era
of structural litigation is “waning” despite the fact that there have
been some success stories for defendants in such suits. 105 There
are two major problems that prevent reliance on structural
litigation as the solution to the indigent defense crisis.
First, public defenders are often not insulated from political
pressures, and that lack of independence prevents defender
offices from challenging the status quo for fear of retaliation such
as being fired or having their budgets cut. 106 Norman Lefstein
begins his book Securing Reasonable Caseloads with the story of
“Pat,” an assistant public defender who realized he was
ineffective because of his caseloads. Pat asked his superiors
about seeking to withdraw from some of his cases, but Pat was
informed that he lacked authority to file a motion to withdraw and
requesting such authority would result in his termination.107
When caseloads become unmanageable, leadership in defender
offices are hesitant to seek withdrawal from new cases or decline
further appointment because of fear that the elected officials they
ultimately answer to will either have them fired 108 or completely

REV. 25, 43 (discussing the “foggy mirror” test and stating, “[i]f you place a mirror in front
of defense counsel during trial and it fogs, counsel is in fact effective.”).
104. The prejudice standard under Strickland is relaxed in conflict of interest claims.
Where an actual conflict exists, such as through joint representation, the defendant only
needs to show an “adverse effect” which is easier to satisfy than “prejudice.” See generally
Anderson, supra note 65, at 438-42.
105. Drinan, supra note 22, at 1330-31. But see Eve Brensike Primus, Structural
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 679, 706 (2007) (arguing that making structural changes to how
ineffective assistance claims are brought could help defendants bring more claims and
receive more favorable review from appellate courts).
106. See Lorelei Laird, When Public Defenders Become Plaintiffs, ABA JOURNAL
(Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/when_public _defenders_become
_plaintiffs/the_gideon_revolution (quoting David Carroll of the Sixth Amendment Center in
Boston stating, “You’re very rarely going to see a public defender system bring a lawsuit
. . . . Unless that system has independence, they’re always going to be afraid to sort of stick
their head above the bunker.”); see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 11, at 1069-72
(discussing the lack of independence for many defender offices).
107. LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2-3.
108. Id. at 22.
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disband the office of the public defender and privatize the
system. 109
Second, there is doubt about the effectiveness of structural
litigation as a strategy. 110 One structural litigation commenter
soberly explains that these suits are very expensive and often fail
to actually improve the plight of public defenders and their clients
even in spite of favorable decisions by the courts. 111 Ultimately,
the problem lies in enforcement because even if a court holds that
funding for indigent defense is constitutionally inadequate, the
legislature has to willingly increase funding for indigent defense,
and proponents of indigent defense will still have to fight for that
funding each year as the budget is decided. 112 Appeals to the
courts are unreliable solutions to the problems of indigent
defense. 113 Advocates of indigent defense cannot expect to
receive help from the courts as long as indigent defendants remain
unpopular. 114

***
The Brennan Center for Justice has put forth three
recommendations on how to best reform indigent defense in
America: (1) removing certain low-level crimes from the criminal
justice network; (2) increasing funding for public defense; and (3)
increasing the effectiveness of defenders by increasing training
and providing social worker support staff. 115 However, as noted
above, state legislatures and the public at large, are generally
unreceptive to calls to increase spending on “criminals.”
Increasing funding through any means is not likely to gain any

109. Laird, supra note 97.
110. Drinan, supra note 22, at 1331-32.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1332 (“Judicial victories still require legislative funding to breathe life into
the court’s holding – funding that must be fought for annually and funding that, history tells
us, will be inadequate. There is simply little money to be had in many jurisdictions, and
legislators may rationally choose to spend it on issues other than indigent defense – whether
that choice is constitutional or not.”).
113. But see Laird, supra note 97 (discussing several recent systemic lawsuits that
have received favorable dispositions for defenders or indigent defendants).
114. Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 122-23 (2012)
(arguing that indigent defense advocates will never receive support from the courts until a
“political identity” is established that will capture the courts’ sympathies).
115. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 8-9.
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political momentum as long as politicians can accuse one another
of being “soft on crime.” Therefore, only a “supply and demand”
solution is available. 116 Increasing the “supply” of public
defenders or increasing their effectiveness both require input by
the state. Increased training is not without expense. For that
reason alone, increased training, hiring more assistants and
investigators, or investing in specialized education programs are
no more feasible as solutions than the primary request of asking
for more funding. A supply side solution will not work.
The remaining option is to reduce the caseloads of public
defenders on the front end. There are competing approaches for
how to reduce the caseloads of defenders. One option is to reduce
the right to counsel for misdemeanors so that defenders can focus
on more serious felony offenses. 117 Another option is to do the
exact opposite. 118 Some have argued that defense rationing
should be skewed in favor of misdemeanors in an attempt to crash
the system. 119 If defenders focus their resources on litigating
misdemeanors rather than letting the hasty plea bargaining system
decide everything, then the strain on the courts would force
prosecutors, police officers, and legislators to decriminalize low
level crimes. 120 As the analysis to follow explains, the most
politically viable option is to seek official decriminalization at the
legislative level – a strategy which is growing increasingly
popular in the political arena. 121

116. Dripps, supra note 114, at 123-31 (comparing alternative solutions such as
reducing the “demand” for public defenders by limiting the caseloads of defenders or
increasing the “supply” of representation such as by allowing representation by lay persons
or making public defense a new type of career path separate in licensing and training from
traditional legal education).
117. See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007).
118. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1089, 1099-1100 (2013).
119. Id.
120. Id. (“More misdemeanor trials, or fewer guilty pleas at an early court appearance,
would impose serious strain on the criminal justice system. If these costs filter down,
prosecutors would be forced to decline prosecution in more cases. This may, in turn, affect
law enforcement, potentially leading the police to exercise discretion in deciding whom they
actually put through the system. Finally, making the system bear more of the true costs of
adjudicating misdemeanor arrests would, hopefully, give legislators a concrete reason (and
perhaps some political coverage) to decriminalize and to refrain from creating more minor
criminal offenses.”).
121. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1069.
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II. DEFINING DECRIMINALIZATION
Misdemeanor decriminalization, in whatever form, has
increasingly been considered as a politically feasible solution to
the indigent defense crisis. 122 Defendants, the state, and the
system all seem to come out on top from decriminalization
efforts. 123 Defendants are able to escape the burdens of the
criminal justice apparatus including stigma and the collateral
consequences that come from a criminal record. 124 The State
consequentially can generally expect decriminalization efforts to
serve as an effective cost-saving measure. 125 The system as a
whole also reaps the rewards because decriminalization can
reduce the burdens of mass incarceration and help soothe racial
disparities. 126 However, it is imperative to have some sort of
working definition of what exactly “decriminalization” is, and
what it is not.
Scholars differ as to how decriminalization should be
conceptualized and categorized. 127 Professor Alexandra Natapoff
argues that there are three categories when discussing
decriminalization. 128 First, there is a distinction between the
terms “decriminalization” and “legalization.” 129 Legalization is a
complete “roll-back” of the state’s regulatory authority for certain
activities, but decriminalization is focused on either reducing or
eliminating criminal sanctions for conduct that is still
regulated. 130 Second, decriminalization itself can be broken
down into two different forms. 131 “Full decriminalization” takes
place when an offense is completely removed from the criminal
“Partial
context and reclassified as a civil offense. 132
decriminalization” occurs when an offense remains criminal in

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1071-77.
124. Id. at 1071-72.
125. Id. at 1072-74.
126. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1074-77.
127. Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic
Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 675 (2015) (listing several different conceptions of
“decriminalization” among legal scholars).
128. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1065-67.
129. Id. at 1066.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1067.
132. Id.
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nature, but the possibility of imprisonment is removed as a
punishment. 133
For the purposes of this comment, I will adopt a competing
framework of decriminalization that identifies four separate
strategies for decriminalization efforts: substitution, de facto
decriminalization, pure decriminalization, and reclassification. 134
Each strategy comes with its own separate benefits and costs.135
If society is to adopt a policy, it needs to be able to fully apprise
the expected gains and consequences of that path of action before
acting.
Substitution involves replacing criminal sanctions with nonpunitive responses as illustrated through drug courts and other
diversion strategies. 136 De facto decriminalization arises when
police and prosecutors simply choose not to enforce certain
offenses due to budget constraints or moral opposition to the
law. 137 Pure decriminalization can also be titled legalization,
where all legal regulation of a conduct is lifted. 138 Lastly,
reclassification involves shifting an offense from the criminal
realm to the civil realm, where the conduct is still regulated and
discouraged, but criminal penalties are replaced with civil
fines. 139
Substitution efforts such as drug courts have been highly
praised as an invaluable tool to divert non-violent drug offenders
away from incarceration and toward treatment. 140 However,
diversion efforts have been criticized for focusing solely on the
sanction aspect of criminalization and still leaving individuals,

133. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1067.
134. Woods, supra note 127, at 683.
135. Id. at 683-96 (discussing four separate ways states have approached
decriminalization).
136. Id. at 683-84.
137. Id. at 686-89 (noting however, de facto decriminalization raises several serious
concerns about inconsistent, selective enforcement of laws against unpopular minorities).
138. Id. at 689; Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1065.
139. See Woods, supra note 127, at 693; see also Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1067
(defining this strategy as “full decriminalization”).
140. See The Hon. Seth W. Norman et. al., Drug Court Success: Outcomes and Cost
Savings of an Innovative Residential Drug Court Treatment Program for Felony Offenders,
TENN. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2015) (“A significant body of literature has been developed to
suggest that drug courts are effective, particularly at reducing recidivism and containing
costs. Meta-analyses comparing the outcomes of multiple drug courts have found significant
reductions in crime and recidivism for program participants.”).
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particularly within minority communities, subject to
stigmatization and other harms from overpolicing. 141
De facto decriminalization serves as a way for law
enforcement officials to exercise their discretion and avoid the
strict penalties the law may call for if the official believes the
sanctions are disproportionate to the reality of the offense. 142
However, decriminalizing offenses purely through law
enforcement discretion poses a risk of “inconsistent, selective,
and discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws.” 143
Full legalization obviously presents the greatest benefit for
those who might traditionally be subject to regulation. Once a
conduct is legalized, 144 there is nothing for the state to regulate,
so the interaction between the citizen and the government should
be eliminated. However, legalization is limited in its application
because certain conduct will always need to be regulated and
restricted in some manner.
For example, driving while
intoxicated needs to be regulated in some form. Even if the
offense is considered civil rather than criminal, 145 there are
certainly robust state interests in public safety that require state
control over the conduct in some form.
Lastly, reclassification offers the benefit of removing
criminal sanctions for certain conduct while still providing the
state the power to regulate the behavior. This approach is a
middle-ground short of legalization that may appease those who
are strongly opposed to lessening restrictions on certain

141. Woods, supra note 127, at 683-86.
142. Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
785, 802-06 (2012) (discussing examples of “prosecutorial decriminalization” such as
treating minor possession of marijuana as a civil offense, failing to strictly enforce threestrike laws, or not prosecuting teens engaged in sexting for child pornography offenses).
143. Woods, supra note 127, at 687; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354
(2001) (holding that a police officer may arrest an individual when he has probable cause
that the individual has committed a crime, even if the crime suspected is a minor one such
as failing to wear a seatbelt). For a related criticism that underenforcement of the criminal
law has a discriminatory effect and undermines respect for the legal system, see generally
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006).
144. The term “legalized” here means that there is no regulation expressly prohibiting
conduct rather than a law affirmatively stating that conduct is now legal.
145. Wisconsin is the only state in the nation where the first offense for drunk driving
(termed Operating While Intoxicated) is not a criminal offense. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.63,
346.65(2) (West 2017).
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conduct. 146 However, the shortcoming of reclassification is that
reclassifying an offense as a “civil” offense does not eliminate the
risk of abuse or stigmatization by the police. 147
No individual strategy of decriminalization is a “one size fits
all” solution. Each approach has its own strengths and
weaknesses. This is a good thing because flexibility is needed
when deciding upon a policy. As explained below, some
strategies will work better for certain offenses than they will for
others. The best strategy is dependent upon careful consideration
of the specific conduct targeted for decriminalization.

III. HOW DECRIMINALIZING MARIJUANA
POSSESSION AND DRIVING WITH A SUSPENDED
LICENSE CAN HELP
Marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license
are prime candidates for decriminalization within the context of
this comment because of the disproportionate share of
misdemeanor dockets which these offenses make up and the
relative feasibility of removing these offenses from the criminal
system. 148 Because different jurisdictions give different crimes
different titles, working definitions should be established for the
crimes being discussed here.
First, the term “marijuana offenses” should be read as simple
possession. 149 Drug trafficking is an altogether separate type of
crime from simple drug use with different political and economic
146. See Kaitlin C. Gratton, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures:
Reclassifying Drug Possession Offenses in Response to the Indigent Defense Crisis, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1039, 1042 n. 9 (2012) (specifically using the term “reclassification” rather
than “decriminalization” in order to avoid negative connotations associated with
decriminalization so as to not alienate readers opposed to reducing the scope of prohibited
behavior).
147. See infra Part III.C discussing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
148. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS
COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED
COUNSEL 2-3 (2010), http:// www.acslaw. org/ sites /default /files /Boruchowitz_-_
Misdemeanors.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC3M-5VKV].
149. Unfortunately, a precise or shared definition of “simple possession” is virtually
nonexistent because there is large disagreement among states about whether marijuana
possession should be a felony or a misdemeanor in the first place and what amount of
marijuana transforms misdemeanor possession to felony possession. Compare MO. ANN.
STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017) (making it a felony to possess thirty-five grams or more
marijuana), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-419 (2016) (requiring four ounces or more of
marijuana to establish felony possession).
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pressures. This comment is limited to removing possession of
marijuana from the criminal realm, but the problems of
distribution, manufacturing, and transportation of marijuana
remain for others to address.
Second, clarity is also necessary when discussing “driving
with a suspended license.” 150 Specifically, the primarily targeted
offense is the offense of driving with a suspended license when
the underlying suspension is based on the inability or failure to
pay some other fine or fee. Arguments can be made that the
sanctions related to the suspension of driver’s licenses for other
reasons such as driving while intoxicated are also too severe and
should be decriminalized to some extent.151 However, the
political reality is that licenses suspended based on unpaid fines
carry a separate level of culpability and risk to society than
licenses suspended based on reckless driving. 152 Therefore, the
politically feasible option would be to limit the discussion to
driving with a suspended license based on unpaid fines or fees
and leave suspensions based on other reasons for future
discussions.
It is appropriate to consider the separate crimes of marijuana
possession and driving on a suspended license simultaneously
because each crime represents a substantial share of the
misdemeanor docket, and each offense carries a separate type of
culpability with one being the use of an illicit substance for a
psychological effect and the other being a resistance to
administrative controls and safety regulations. A marijuana user
is illegally consuming a product with the hope to achieve some
psycho-active, hallucinogenic effect. An unauthorized driver is
ignoring an administrative or adjudicatory determination that the
individual is not fit to operate a motor vehicle. The former is a
drug crime, and the latter is a traffic violation. Normatively, these
150. Driving with a suspended license can be criminalized in many forms. For
example, the offense exists in three separate statutes in the state of Arkansas. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-65-105 (2016) (suspension for drunk driving); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-303
(2014 & Supp. 2017) (general statute for suspended license based on traffic history); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 27-19-304 (2014) (specialty provision with limited application for the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act).
151. E.g., in Arkansas, driving on a suspended license related to driving while
intoxicated results in a mandatory minimum of ten days imprisonment. ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-65-105 (2016).
152. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at n. 118 (noting suspensions based on driving
history can be viewed as a public safety issue).
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offenses carry separate levels of culpability and moral
stigmatization. This distinction is important when considering
what policy options are available for each offense.

A. Share of Misdemeanor Dockets
Marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license
have a substantial impact on misdemeanor caseloads across the
nation. In some jurisdictions, driving with a suspended license,
possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of alcohol cases
can make up between 40% to 50% of misdemeanor caseloads. 153
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be completely accurate when
describing the “data” of misdemeanors because of problems with
underreporting 154 and ambiguity with how crimes are classified
and reported. 155 Even with these problems, there is still some
reliable data illustrating the burdens marijuana possession and
driving with a suspended license cases put on courts.
In Texas, drug offenses make up 20% of the entire
misdemeanor criminal docket, and over three-fourths of those

153. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 1.
154. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1321 (“[T]his arena is plagued by underreporting.”).
155. Woods, supra note 127, at 743 and accompanying text. What is misdemeanor
simple possession in Arkansas is reported as felony possession of a controlled substance in
Missouri. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017) (making it a felony to possess
thirty-five grams or more marijuana) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-419 (2016) (requiring
four ounces or more of marijuana to establish felony possession). In Missouri, what might
otherwise be considered simple possession of marijuana is categorically thrown in with
felony possession of a controlled substance, so it is impossible to look at caseload data in
Missouri and actually figure out how many of the reported felony possession cases actually
involve simple possession cases. MO. ANN. STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017). Because states
are free to choose how to classify and penalize marijuana possession, it is impossible in some
circumstances to look at a reported conviction and determine if the underlying conduct was
merely possession of a small amount of marijuana or something more serious such as
trafficking. See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1058; see generally Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569
U.S. 184, 206 (2013) (holding it is impossible to determine if a conviction under Georgia
law for “possession with intent to distribute” actually required proof of more than simple
possession to qualify the conviction as an aggravated felony for immigration proceedings).
In Moncrieffe, the defendant had pled guilty to felony possession with intent to distribute for
having 1.3 grams, or two to three cigarettes, of marijuana in his car. Id. at 188. This is a
perfect example of the dilemma of identifying “simple possession” data. The defendant was
in possession of an extremely small amount of marijuana, but Georgia will report his
conviction as felony trafficking of a controlled substance. Id. For empirical purposes,
identifying hard numbers of marijuana possession prosecutions is extremely difficult given
the wide variation in how states classify and report crimes.
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drug cases are possession of marijuana cases, 156 meaning
possession of marijuana makes up approximately 15% of the
entire misdemeanor criminal docket in the state of Texas. 157 In
New York City, criminal possession of marijuana in the 5th
degree 158 has decreased in charging frequency, but still remains
one of the most frequently charged offenses at arraignment. 159 In
2010, 5th degree possession was the number one most frequently
charged misdemeanor offense with a little more than 40,000 total
charges out of 272,400 total misdemeanors, but by 2015, 5th
degree possession fell to being only the sixth most frequently
charged misdemeanor in New York City with only approximately
15,000 total charges out of 222,579 total misdemeanors. 160 In
Missouri, misdemeanor possession of marijuana made up at
least 161 approximately 14% of all drug related prosecutions and
approximately 9% of the entire misdemeanor docket in Fiscal
Year 2015. 162 Misdemeanor possession was the twelfth most
156. In Texas, possession of less than four ounces is a misdemeanor. TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121 (West 2017).
157. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1308021/
2015-ar-statistical-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLK3-JGGF].
158. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2017) (criminalizing possession of
marijuana in public and the marijuana is burning or open to public view or possessing
substances containing marijuana with an aggregate weight of more than twenty-five grams).
159. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2015 29-30 (2016).
160. Id. at 25, 29.
161. It is impossible to tell how many additional incidents of possession were
prosecuted as felony distribution or felony possession. This is especially true since passing
a marijuana cigarette to a friend is felony distribution in Missouri. MO. ANN. STAT. §
195.211 (West 2017) (felony distribution or delivery of less than five grams of marijuana).
The actual percentage of simple possession cases in Missouri is likely higher than calculated.
162. There were 1,335 charges filed at the circuit level for violations of MO. REV.
STAT. § 195.202(3) (West 2016) (possession of up to thirty-five grams of marijuana).
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM
SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: CIRCUIT LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015
(2016), https:// www.nycourts.gov /COURTS / nyc /criminal /2015_ crim_ crt_ ann_
rpt_%20062316_fnl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZV3-5Q3A]. There were 8,006 charges filed
for the same offense at the associate level. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR,
MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED:
ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), https://www.courts.mo.Gov
/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/44EG-EG56]. A total of 64,651 drug related charges
were filed at both levels. See OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI
JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILES AND DISPOSED: CIRCUIT
LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), https:// www.nycourts.gov /COURTS /nyc /criminal
/2015 _crim_crt_ann_rpt_%20062316_fnl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZV3-5Q3A]; OFFICE OF
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frequently charged drug offense at both the associate level and the
circuit level. 163
Driving on a suspended license is also a heavy contributor to
misdemeanor caseloads. Driving on a suspended license 3rd
degree was the fifth most frequent misdemeanor in New York
City with slightly more than 15,000 total charges in 2015. 164 In
Little Rock, Arkansas, driving without a license or on a suspended
license makes up approximately 12-20% of all tickets in a given
year. 165 One report found that in Grand Traverse County,
Michigan, driving with a suspended license made up about 10%
of all cases. 166 For public defenders in the State of Washington,
driving with a suspended license based on unpaid fines has been
found to make up around one-third of all misdemeanors
throughout the entire state. 167 In the city of Longview,
Washington, the public defender’s office is essentially forced to

STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED
DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/44EG-EG56]. A total of
102,003 misdemeanors were filed in the state during Fiscal Year 2015. OFFICE OF STATE
COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 26 CIRCUIT
COURT, FY 2015 CRIMINAL CASES FILED, DISPOSED AND PENDING (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/J3ER-2CS6]; OFFICE OF
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED
DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/ARA5-D9LH].
163. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT –
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19 CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED
(2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM];
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE
20 ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA].
164. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK ANNUAL REPORT 2015 29 (2016),
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2015_crim_crt_ann_rpt_%20062316_fnl
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TFJ-VH7F].
165. Alexis Rogers, New Law Can Help Suspended Drivers Get License Back & Keep
Money, KATV (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.katv.com/news/local/new-law-can-helpsuspended-drivers-get-license-back-keep-money [https://perma.cc/YQ9C-CLGN].
166. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 26.
167. JOANNE I. MOORE & DAVID K. CHAPMAN, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE: DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 3RD DEGREE SURVEY OF COURTS
OF LIMITED JURISDICTION 1 (2008), http://www. opd.wa.gov /documents/00562008_DWLS3Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FJY-WHX7]; MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16,
at 29 (noting pre-filing diversion for one municipal court would reduce the defender’s
misdemeanor caseload by 46%).
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dedicate one of its five attorneys to work full-time on suspended
license cases. 168
For Fiscal Year 2015 in Missouri, a first offense of driving
with a suspended license was only punishable by a fine of
$300, 169 so public defenders did not need to be appointed to
handle those cases. 170 During that time, a total of 13,289 charges
were filed for first offenses of driving with a suspended license. 171
If those offenses were still Class A misdemeanors punishable by
up to a year in prison, 172 the burden of public defenders would
potentially be extended to covering an additional 13% of the
entire misdemeanor docket. 173

B. Benefits
There are several direct and indirect benefits that will result
from decriminalization. For example, the thesis of this entire
comment is that reducing the caseloads of public defenders will
allow public defenders to spend more time on their remaining
cases, in theory, providing a higher level of representation than

168. DRIVEN TO FAIL: THE HIGH COST OF WASHINGTON’S MOST INEFFECTIVE
CRIME – DWLS III, ACLU 9 (2017) [hereinafter DRIVEN TO FAIL]. The office is forced to
spend $135,000 annually defending suspended license cases. Id.
169. MO. ANN. STAT. § 302.321 (West 2016); H.B. 111, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2011).
170. See supra Part I describing the extent of the right to appointed counsel.
171. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT –
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19 CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED
(2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM];
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE
20 ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA].
172. The law was amended in 2011 from a Class A misdemeanor to a fine only offense.
See H.B. 111, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
173. See OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT –
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 26 CIRCUIT COURT, FY 2015 CRIMINAL CASES FILED, DISPOSED AND
PENDING (2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov /file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/J3ER2CS6] (There were a total of 102,003 misdemeanors filed in fiscal year 2015.); OFFICE OF
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19
CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM]; OFFICE OF
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 20
ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA].
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would be permitted under the current caseloads. 174 In Texas, the
decriminalization of marijuana would remove the need to appoint
counsel for 15% of the entire misdemeanor docket. 175 When
Missouri decriminalized driving with a suspended license, it
successfully avoided having to provide counsel for 13% of its
misdemeanor docket. 176 Given that approximately 80% of all
criminal defendants are eligible for public representation, 177
reducing caseloads overall will certainly have a substantial impact
on relieving the caseloads of public defenders.
In addition, there are collateral benefits that can be expected.
Depending on the decriminalization strategy adopted, the
collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction could be
eliminated or reduced. Misdemeanors carry harsh collateral
consequences that follow misdemeanants around affecting
employment prospects, restricting voting rights, eliminating
eligibility for loans or public benefits, and causing other
stigmatizing harms. 178 Reducing an individual’s exposure to the
misdemeanor process by decriminalizing his conduct can prevent
the individual from being convicted in the first place and having
those collateral consequences attach.
Furthermore, the entire criminal justice system can benefit
financially from decriminalizing marijuana possession and
driving on a suspended license. One report estimated that nationwide decriminalization of marijuana possession and driving on a
suspended license could save over $2 billion. 179 Another report
calculated the costs to prosecute a single charge of marijuana
possession range from $1,577 to as high as $7,000 resulting in
statewide annual expenditures on marijuana possession arrests
174. Contra David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The
Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 385 (2014) (arguing that reforms that reduce
caseloads of public defenders would have no impact because state legislatures would
accordingly reduce funding for defense services as caseloads decline).
175. See ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR
2015 (2015), supra note 157, at 1.
176. See BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148 (13,289 charges filed for first offense driving
with a suspended license divided by 102,003 total misdemeanors filed equals approximately
13%).
177. Primus, supra note 105, at 687-88; cf. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53
(“[R]esearchers estimate that anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of criminal defendants need
publicly-funded attorneys, depending on the jurisdiction.”).
178. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1323-27; Roberts, supra note 20, at 297-303.
179. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 4.
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and adjudication anywhere between $78 million to $364
million.180 In Missouri, the legalization of marijuana would not
only eliminate the need to appoint counsel in 9% of all
misdemeanor cases, but the state would no longer need to spend
over $49 million enforcing marijuana possession laws.181
Driving with a suspended license is also burdensome to enforce.
One report estimates the expense of prosecuting a single case of
driving with a suspended license to range from $568 to $1,107.182
The state of Washington spent approximately $42 million
enforcing driving with a suspended license charges in 2015. 183
Another collateral benefit of the legalization or
decriminalization of certain minor crimes may arise in the form
of increased racial equality. Legalizing possession of marijuana
is one example of where racial disparities in the criminal justice
system might be softened. The American Civil Liberties Union
looked at national arrest data for 2010 and found that across the
nation, African Americans were 3.73 times more likely to be
arrested for marijuana possession than white individuals. 184 At
the individual state level, the African American arrest rate grew
as high as 8.34 times more likely to be arrested than whites at the
top of the spectrum and still remained more than double the arrest
rate of whites at the lowest end of the spectrum. 185 If marijuana
is legalized in a state, then the police have no authority to arrest
anyone for that activity regardless of race.
Unfortunately, suspended licenses also have a notably
disproportionate impact on minority communities. Seattle’s City
Attorney reported that even though African Americans make up
only 8% of the city’s population, they make up over 40% of all

180. KATHLEEN KANE-WILLIS ET AL., PATCHWORK POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF
ARRESTS AND TICKETS FOR MARIJUANA MISDEMEANORS IN ILLINOIS 3 (2014),
http://www.roosevelt.edu/~/media/Files/pdfs/CAS/ICDP?PatchworkPolicyFUllReport.ashx
[http://perma.cc/2L96-QQLY].
181. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 160 (Jun. 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58QGNHEV] [hereinafter THE WAR ON MARIJUANA].
182. See DRIVEN TO FAIL, supra note 168, at 8.
183. Id. at 9.
184. THE WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 181, at 9.
185. Id. at 18.
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driving with a suspended license 3rd degree charges. 186 A less
obvious, but more insidious, form of the racial disparity
surrounding suspended licenses is illustrated by the unacceptable
practices in Ferguson, Missouri. The U.S. Department of Justice
found a system that disproportionately targets poor minorities by
using traffic citations, ultimately leading to suspended licenses
for inability to pay, as means to generate revenue and force a cycle
of indebtedness to the city. 187 It cannot be said that legalizing
marijuana and decriminalizing driving on a suspended license
would guarantee that the police no longer disproportionately
arrest African Americans for every other crime that remains on
the books, but it would at least reduce one source of racial
inequality which is a step in the right direction. 188

C. Hidden Dangers
There is, however, an unconsidered “dark side” of
decriminalization that is often overlooked. 189
Incomplete
decriminalization efforts, such as reducing the offense to a nonjailable misdemeanor, can be a dangerous solution because once
the threat of imprisonment is removed from an offense, the right
to counsel no longer attaches even though many of the same
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction occur when the
punishment is a mere fine. 190 Furthermore, it is far too common
that municipalities unfairly target minority populations with
various fines and fees as a source of revenue which actually
deepens racial divides. 191 When individuals cannot afford to pay
186. Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents Charged with
Misdemeanors: Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 13 (2015) (testimony of
Professor Robert C. Boruchowitz at 13).
187. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T (Mar. 4, 2015). This type of systemic inequality is not unique
to Ferguson, MO. See also LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY AREA, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE
INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 19 (2015) (finding a disproportionate impact of traffic citations
and license suspensions among African Americans in San Francisco).
188. Professor Natapoff has argued that the current structure of the misdemeanor
process has strong racial biases that have institutionalized the concept of trapping racial
minorities in the criminal justice system and presuming guilt for minorities. See Natapoff,
supra note 30, at 1368-72.
189. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1077-93.
190. Id. at 1078.
191. Id. at 1100.
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their fines, they may still end up in prison for failure to pay. 192
Most importantly, even though an offense may be a “nonjailable
civil offense,” an individual may still be arrested and held in a jail
cell. 193
While hidden risks do indeed lie in the decriminalization
process, they are not unique to decriminalization. It cannot be
said that racial minorities are only disproportionately targeted
once decriminalization occurs. Racial minority groups have
historically been the target of the criminal justice system in the
first place. 194 The problem with racial disparities likely lies in
policing efforts rather than with the structure of the law itself.195
Incarcerations for failure to pay fines can also be remedied.
Affirmative defenses for inability to pay can easily be
incorporated to protect indigent defendants. 196 However, while
some may argue that such affirmative defenses go ignored by
local courts, 197 that is a separate problem from the actual policy
of decriminalization. A court’s refusal to honor a statutory
affirmative defense goes to deeper issues of judicial authority and
appellate review for miscarriages of justice which is an entirely
separate discussion.
The strongest criticism against decriminalization is the fact
that a nonjailable offense can still result in arrest and
imprisonment. 198 In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly
upheld the six-day incarceration and strip search of a man arrested
for the “civil” offense of contempt for failure to pay a fine, a
nonjailable offense under applicable state law. 199 What is perhaps
the most troubling is that states seemingly lack the authority to
limit the behavior of their police officers. Custodial arrests for
192. Id. at 1081.
193. Id. at 1080.
194. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1070.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703(c)(1) (2010) (stating a defendant may
show that the default was not attributable to a purposeful refusal to obey the sentence or a
failure on behalf of the defendant to make a good-faith effort to obtain the funds to pay the
fine).
197. See, e.g., Shawnya Meyers, Arkansas Cancer Patient Sent to “Debtors Prison”
Over Bounced Checks, Spurs ACLU Lawsuit, 5NEWS (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://5newsonline.com/2016/08/25/arkansas-cancer-patient-sent-to-debtors-prison-overbounced-checks-spurs-aclu-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/8ZW8-D3EL].
198. See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1079.
199. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 323, 339 (2012).
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nonjailable offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even when state law
expressly prohibits arrests in such situations. 200 This is a
frightening proposition. A state can provide clear statutory
guidance to police officers not to arrest individuals for certain
minor offenses, but a police officer’s disregard of such laws is
fine as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.
The line of judicial authority granting officers the power to
arrest and jail those charged with committing minor offenses that
have theoretically been removed from the criminal process does
indeed give rise for concern. However, once again, these
concerns speak more so to issues of local policing rather than the
actual structures of the criminal code. 201 Even though police
officers may have the authority to arrest for decriminalized
offenses, it is up to state legislatures to make it a priority to
reinforce a value system among its law enforcement members that
the exercise of such authority is not going to be tolerated. An
officer may not violate the Fourth Amendment when an arrest for
a nonjailable offense is made in spite of state law, but that does
not mean that the officer cannot violate local department protocol
or other guidelines resulting in the officer’s discipline or
termination. Vigilant oversight of policing priorities by state
legislatures is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that the
values of a reformed criminal code are reflected in the everyday
interactions between citizens and the law. 202

IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Going forward, policy makers should be cognizant that no
one strategy of decriminalization will be effective for every
offense being decriminalized. For a given offense, some
strategies will be overly-broad and some will be under-inclusive.
200. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
201. See generally Woods, supra note 127 (arguing conversations of decriminalization
should not focus exclusively on reducing sanctions but also on modifying policing of
decriminalized offenses).
202. For an aggressive criticism of New York City’s police enforcement of city
ordinances regarding behavior on the subway, such as arresting individuals for taking up
more than one seat, see Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax, if You Want, but
Don’t Put Your Feet Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-offense-on-ny-subway-can-bring-ticket-or-handcuffs.html
[https://perma.cc/B7T4-84FH].
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The right tool needs to be chosen for the right job. Furthermore,
policy makers should be mindful of public sentiment when
determining whether or not it is time to finally roll back the reach
of the criminal law. If legislatures are truly responsive to public
opinion, the scope of the criminal law should ebb and flow with
time, expanding at one time in one area and shrinking at another
time in another area. 203 Currently, public opinion calls for
decriminalization of marijuana possession and driving with a
suspended license.

A. Different Solutions for Different Conduct
Using the above-mentioned four-part framework for
decriminalization, it is plainly obvious that not all four strategies
are viable for both marijuana offenses and driving with a
suspended license. Marijuana possession can be approached
under any one of the four methods, but driving with a suspended
license cannot. In fact, possession of marijuana has been tackled
under each strategy across the nation as the states experiment with
decriminalizing the substance. 204 Some jurisdictions have chosen
not to prosecute minor possession offenses. 205 Others have
reclassified possession of small amounts as fine-only civil
violations. 206 Some jurisdictions have even gone as far as fully
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. 207 Any given
strategy of decriminalization can be appropriate when discussing
marijuana possession.
Some of those options are not available for driving with a
suspended license. Pure decriminalization or legalization is never
going to be an option for driving with a suspended license. As
long as the suspension of one’s driver’s license is an available
203. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 527-28.
204. For an interactive map detailing state laws regarding marijuana, see
http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/JC8Z-ALJK].
205. Woods, supra note 127, at 687-88 (detailing how the District Attorney for Dane
County, Wisconsin promised not to prosecute anyone possessing less than one ounce of
marijuana).
206. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601(c)(2)(ii) (West 2017) (possession
or use of less than ten grams of marijuana is a civil offense subject to a civil penalty of one
hundred to five hundred dollars).
207. NORML,
Legalization,
http://
norml.org
/legal
/legalization
[https://perma.cc/QBD7-2XV5] (eight states and the District of Columbia have legalized
recreational use of marijuana).
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sanction, the failure to honor that sanction will be penalized itself
in some form even if through civil fines. In order to legalize
driving on a suspended license, states would have to forfeit the
power to revoke someone’s driving privileges, and that is just not
a very wise idea in the least. After all, some individuals are
dangerous drivers who should not be allowed to operate motor
vehicles for the safety of their fellow commuters. 208
Alternatively, licenses may be suspended not because the
individual is a hazard to public safety but because the individual
has failed to pay fines or fees such as parking tickets or even failed
to pay child support. 209 In either case, the offense of driving with
a suspended license is the offense of not honoring a court or other
adjudicatory order somewhat comparable to contempt.
Legalization is not a viable option for addressing driving with a
suspended license. No matter what the reason is for the
underlying suspension, the ability for the state to exercise some
sort of regulatory control over driving privileges and being able
to enforce those controls are important state interests that should
be preserved.
For the same reasons, de facto decriminalization would also
be highly inappropriate. What is the point of having a license if
the actual test is whether or not the traffic officer on the scene is
the one who gets to decide if you are fit to operate a motor
vehicle? If a court suspends an individual’s license for driving
while intoxicated, and an officer chooses not to enforce that order
when he pulls over an individual on a suspended license because
of the officer’s moral opposition to the sanction itself, then the
executive branch is effectively undermining the authority of the
judicial branch. Respect for the courts will be lost and the
uniform administration of the law will suffer.
Driving with a suspended license is more narrowly
constrained to be addressed through substitution or
reclassification. Diversion programs have found moderate
success in several jurisdictions. 210 Those jurisdictions have
208. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-907 (2014) (allowing the Office of Driver
Services to suspend the license of a driver for up to one year upon a showing that the driver
is a habitual violator of traffic laws, is a habitually reckless or negligent driver, has been
involved in an accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another, or for other
cause).
209. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 26.
210. Id. at 28-29.
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adopted relicensing programs which allow individuals to pay the
underlying fines that caused the suspension of the license through
a payment plan or through community service, and upon
completion, the driving on a suspended license charge is
dropped. 211 Spokane, Washington adopted a relicensing program
that even lifted the suspension on the participants’ licenses before
the fines were paid as long as they were participating in the
diversion program. 212 In 2004, the King County, Washington
program reduced driving with a suspended license prosecutions
by 84% and actually generated revenues of $270,000 for the
county within the first nine months of operation. 213 That sort of
impact is phenomenal.

B. Public Sentiment
Furthermore, the tide of history suggests it is finally time to
remove criminal sanctions from marijuana possession and driving
with a suspended license. Currently, twenty-eight states have
legalized the medicinal use of marijuana, and several others have
allowed for the medicinal use of Cannabidiol (CBD), a nonpsychoactive extract from cannabis plants with medicinal
properties. 214 Taking things even further, eight states and the
District of Columbia have completely decriminalized the
recreational use of marijuana. 215 Among the states where
marijuana remains an illegal substance, four states have
reclassified marijuana and removed jail time as a punishment for
possessing small amounts of marijuana. 216 The national trend is
already pushing towards the decriminalization of marijuana
possession.
The same historical pressure exists for decriminalizing
driving with a suspended license. “Since 1970, twenty-two states

211. Id. at 28; see also BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 7-11 (summarizing and
contrasting relicensing programs among several counties in Washington).
212. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 28-29.
213. Id. at 28.
214. NORML, Medical Marijuana, http://norml.org /legal /medical- marijuana- 2
[https://perma.cc/EG8Z-6XG9].
215. NORML, Legalization, http://norml.org /legal /legalization [https://perma.cc
/QBD7-2XV5].
216. Marijuana Policy Project, State Policy, https://www.mpp.org /states /
[https://perma.cc /GE8H-2RA2].
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have decriminalized the bulk of minor traffic offenses by
removing criminal penalties and reclassifying the offenses as
noncriminal offenses.” 217 There were two primary motivations
for the decriminalization of traffic offenses. First, there were
concerns that it is unfair to impose criminal sanctions for minor
traffic offenses given “their omnipresence and lack of
severity.” 218 Second, state legislatures were driven by pragmatic
concerns of cost-cutting because traffic violations were clogging
court dockets, officers were forced to take time to appear in court
to make traffic tickets “stick,” and as criminal offenses, the
accused enjoyed the right to counsel which further exacerbated
the expense of enforcing traffic tickets. 219 However, even among
the wave of states moving traffic violations out of the criminal
realm, driving with a suspended license remained a criminal
offense. 220
It is time to accept the fact that driving with a suspended
license should be included among those traffic offenses that have
been reclassified. Driving with a suspended license continues to
clog up courts and force people to spend countless days in jail
simply because of an inability to pay pre-existing court fines and
fees. 221

V. CONCLUSION
Decriminalization of minor offenses is not a perfect solution.
Decriminalization will not definitively end racism in America.
Decriminalization will not suddenly bring public defender
caseloads into compliance with standards. Decriminalization will
not stop private citizens from being involuntarily dragged through
the criminal justice system based on the discretion of law
enforcement. Decriminalization is not a perfect solution to every
problem with the American penal system.
However,
decriminalization is a step in the right direction.

217. Woods, supra note 127, at 698.
218. Id. at 701.
219. Id. at 701-02 (“Underlying these three concerns was a cost-benefit calculus
centering on maintaining the infrastructure necessary to impose criminal sanctions.”).
220. Id. at 699.
221. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 165 (noting one woman spent 120 days in jail
because of unpaid fines when the individual could not afford to pay the outstanding $1,100).
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Reducing public defender caseloads is the first step. After
that, it has to be ensured that state legislatures do not use reduced
caseloads as a justification for reducing public defense funding
and essentially undoing any benefit gained from
decriminalization. Also, discussions of police discretion and
interaction with the public surrounding decriminalized offenses
need to take place. Ultimately, the institution of poverty needs to
be dismantled in order to prevent so many individuals from being
trapped in a cycle of recidivism constantly entering and leaving
the criminal justice system. These are all tall orders. Some of
them may never truly be achievable, but we have to start
somewhere. We have to walk before we can run.
There is an economic reality to criminal justice that state
legislatures must face. States cannot continue to criminalize and
punish behavior if the state cannot afford to enforce those
sanctions in a way that does not run afoul of the United States
Constitution. The states are obligated to provide effective
assistance of counsel for every indigent defendant facing
imprisonment. Currently, many states are falling short of that
mandate. If legislatures are unwilling to raise defense funding in
order to provide the competent level of assistance demanded by
the constitution, then states must realize that they cannot afford to
strictly punish certain minor offenses. It is time to stop the
bleeding. It is time to take the right to counsel seriously and
develop a solution to the crisis of indigent defense so that justice
can still be done.
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